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Abstract 
 
Fault injection is frequently used for the verification and 
validation of the fault tolerant features of microprocessors.  
This paper proposes the modification of a common on-
chip debugging (OCD) infrastructure to add fault injection 
capabilities and improve performance. The proposed 
solution imposes a very low logic overhead and provides a 
flexible and efficient mechanism for the execution of fault 
injection campaigns, being applicable to different target 
system architectures. 
 
1 Introduction 
In safety critical applications dependability is of 
fundamental importance. Dependable systems are 
designed to handle errors that originate from software or 
hardware faults and recover from them, while maintaining 
acceptable operating conditions. The possibly destructive 
nature of a failure and the long error latencies impair 
identifying the cause of failures in field operation and in 
the normal time that it takes for a failure to occur. To 
identify and understand possible errors, it is desirable to 
experiment on an actual device as to better study and 
improve its dependability. This approach can be applied 
either in the development phase, where models or 
prototypes are used, or on the deployment phase if faults 
can be deliberately injected in useful time without 
damaging the equipment. This experiment-based approach 
requires knowledge of the system architecture and 
behavior, and especially of the mechanisms implemented 
to provide tolerance to faults, errors or failures, i.e. the 
events leading to a service failure on microprocessor 
based systems [1]. Specific instruments and tools must be 
used to induce these hazards and monitor their effects. In 
the case of microprocessor based systems, access to the 
internal resources is of utmost importance. Many of 
today’s microprocessors provide such access through 
dedicated built-in debug circuitry, which is often 
designated as on-chip debug (OCD). Using these OCD 
infrastructures for fault injection purposes is an efficient 
solution for verifying and validating fault tolerant designs. 
This paper proposes to upgrade these infrastructures by 
adding specific functionalities to improve the fault 
injection process. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next 
section gives an overview of fault injection methodologies 
used on microprocessor based systems; section 3 presents 
the system used for our case study and our proposal to 
modify existing OCD infrastructures for enhanced fault 
injection support; section 4 presents the experimental 
results obtained so far and finally section 5 discusses these 
results and lays the basis for future work.  
 
2 Fault Injection Methodologies 
A mean to achieve dependability is the use of fault-
tolerant components. In this sense fault injection can be 
used to: 
? Identify design or implementation faults. 
? Verify & validate and fault tolerance capabilities. 
? Estimate how often failures will occur and evaluate the 
consequences of such failures. 
A fault injection mechanism must be adapted to its target 
system and must include the following components:  
? A fault injector: the device used for the actual fault 
injection and that requires some type of communication 
channel with the target to be able to affect it. This 
channel may be non-physical and in some techniques it 
may be bi-directional returning some type of 
information to the fault injector. The fault injector is 
normally capable of injecting different types of faults 
according to a given fault model, defined beforehand.  
? A workload generator: outputs commands and data to 
the target system. These can be signals, synthetic code, 
benchmarks or complete applications. 
? A data collector: retrieves the necessary information 
from the target system to characterize the fault injection 
and the target response. An associated data analyzer is 
used when the collected data requires processing and in 
most cases this analysis is performed off-line, at a later 
time.  
Fault injection is normally structured in campaigns, each 
being composed of a series of experiments during which 
the target system runs (a specific workload is activated) 
and a specific fault (or set of faults) is inserted at specific 
trigger conditions. The target system behavior is 
monitored and information is recorded as 
comprehensively as necessary and possible, as to later 
understand and evaluate the effects of the inserted faults. 
Existent microprocessors fault injection techniques are 
commonly classified in three broad groups, namely: 
? Simulation based fault injection. 
? Software based fault injection (SWIFI) 
? Physical fault injection (sometimes designated as 
hardware based). 
Simulation based fault injection is mostly used in the early 
phases of a design when the target system exists only in 
model format. To use this technique it is necessary:  a 
model of the target itself, normally in some HDL format; 
the necessary simulation tools to insert faults; adequate 
processing capabilities to run the simulation [2].  
Software based fault injection consists of reproducing at a 
logical level the errors originated by physical faults using 
software commands already available on the target device. 
SWIFI allows the injection of errors on all resources 
accessible by software like registers, program and data 
memory, most peripherals and some timers [3].  
Physical fault injection is a more realistic approach in the 
sense that it tries to replicate real world faults. All 
physical techniques perform an actual fault insertion on 
the circuit or emulate their immediate consequences 
(errors) through internal or external action. Access to the 
circuit elements is usually performed either trough 
specific hardware equipment [4] or using debug and test 
infrastructures included on the target chip [5]. Physical 
fault injection may also be performed without a direct 
connection between the fault injector and the system 
under test, either through laser [6], heavy-ion radiation or 
electromagnetic fields [7]. 
Simulation techniques can be used on an early phase of 
development but are often time-consuming and may lack 
fault coverage as they are intrinsically dependant on the 
quality of the available model. SWIFI techniques are less 
expensive but require modifications to the running code 
which in fact modifies the target system and faults can 
only be inserted in the resources accessible by software. 
Physical fault injection usually allows a better 
representation of real world faults but it is usually more 
expensive and sometimes less controllable.  
The hardest part of fault injection in microprocessors is 
how to access those internal elements where faults are 
more probable, generally the memory elements and 
communication buses, without disturbing the running 
applications. OCD infrastructures provide a solution for 
this problem as they allow access to most microprocessor 
elements and are designed for use without taking any 
resources from the processor. The functionalities provided 
by the OCD vary between implementations, but usually 
include run control, breakpoint support, code tracing and 
access to memory and internal registers. In most 
implementations, the microprocessor must be halted and 
placed into a special debug mode during OCD 
interactions. OCD also requires some external hardware, 
to support the communication between the chip and a 
debugger host. OCD infrastructures are generally based on 
different architectures and access ports, normally 
requiring specific hardware and often with proprietary 
parts. Each microprocessor developer generally has its 
own name for this technology, such as BDM, OnCE, and 
MPSD, and other simply add debug capabilities to 
existing JTAG test ports. Debuggers are available from 
multiple sources normally as a combination of hardware 
and software tailored for a specific target system. 
OCD infrastructures provide access to internal resources 
in parallel with the target hardware and running software, 
being an excellent mechanism for modifying register and / 
or memory values (i.e. insert faults) and subsequently 
retrieve the data necessary for results analysis. An added 
value is the non-intrusive nature of this form of fault 
injection, as it requires no modification to the target 
system. As a technological solution, the major problem 
with OCD is the lack of a consistent set of capabilities and 
a standard communications interface across processor 
architectures.  
An industry consortium called NEXUS has been working 
on the establishment of a standard for OCD. It's formally 
called IEEE-ISTO 5001 [8]. If widely adopted, it may be 
possible to use the same remote debugger to access the 
core of multiple different processors and to use a common 
set of debugging features for all of them. This standard is 
still in a proposal phase, but already presents an 
interesting possibility for the development of common 
fault injection methodologies for the verification & 
validation of dependable microprocessor-based systems. 
Most fault injection techniques that use OCD rely on 
halting the processor, either by the use of external control 
signals or using breakpoints, and subsequently modify the 
targeted registers or memory locations to emulate a fault. 
The usual approach involves a host machine running the 
fault injection campaign and a debugger accessing the 
target infrastructure. 
A microprocessor compliant with class 2 or above of the 
NEXUS standard must provide trace information on-the-
fly and may allow memory access through the OCD with 
the processor running. Experimental work has been done 
in our research group and in the DISCA-UPV [9] using 
real-time fault injection on a MPC565 based system, 
which is the most widely used NEXUS compliant 
microprocessor. The obtained results confirmed most of 
the expected potentialities and simultaneously identified 
some shortcomings both in fault triggering and 
performance. It proved possible to insert faults in memory 
space on-the-fly and then use the trace information 
gathered as an effective mean to analyze program flow, 
before and after the actual fault activation. However, both 
NEXUS compliant debuggers used [10] [11] communicate 
with the PC running the fault campaigns either through 
Ethernet or USB connections, which imposes a critical 
limitation on real time access on high performance 
systems. As the PC manages most debugging functions, it 
proves difficult to read memory contents and write back a 
modified value before the initial data is actually 
overwritten by the application running on the target 
system. The magnitude of the problem depends of the 
running application and memory position targeted, but in 
some cases it is impossible to insert the desired fault 
without halting program execution. Fault activation is also 
a difficulty as even when reading trace data without 
halting the processor, this information is not readily 
available, as it must reach the host machine before it can 
be acted upon and this delay can be measured in 
milliseconds or more, which effectively prevents its use 
for fault triggering. A solution to counter these limitations 
would be either speeding-up the debug data flow or 
moving the decision making elements nearer to the target 
device. 
 
3 Case Study 
3.1 Target System 
Two areas where it is possible to improve the fault 
injection capabilities in microprocessor systems with 
built-in debugging mechanisms are the debugger and the 
OCD itself. In an effort to cover the most ground we opted 
to conduct experiments on both areas and compare the 
obtained results. The use of NEXUS compliant devices 
benefits from the useful debugging features defined in the 
standard and increases the area of immediate applicability 
of the developed concepts and solutions. As neither the 
actual commercial NEXUS debuggers nor the compatible 
CPUs are easily modifiable, we selected an alternative 
microprocessor core where a NEXUS compliant OCD 
could be implemented. A customized debugger was also 
required, as available devices require specific libraries for 
each target. We opted for developing the OCD and the 
debugger as VHDL modules, aiming to keep them simple, 
both to be easily portable and to maintain a high level of 
compatibility with different target architectures. In this 
way a complete proof-of-concept solution can be tested 
and the requirements for its migration to existent or in 
development systems will also be evaluated.   
As the microprocessor target we selected the cpugenerator 
[12] building tool, which is publicly available through 
opencores [13]. This tool allows the automatic creation of 
4, 8, 16 or 32 bit RISC microprocessor cores.  It is 
possible to configure several microprocessor parameters 
like bus type, interrupt support and memory configuration. 
Depending on configuration, this microprocessor is 
expected to run between 23 and 138 MHz on a Xilinx[14] 
Virtex2 device, when synthesized with ISE 7.1i. 
The OCD infrastructure was designed to be compliant 
with the NEXUS 5001 standard proposal. As there is no 
mandatory implementation, it is based on the 
infrastructure present on the MPC565 microcontroller, 
which is a well-documented compliant device. The 
version actually implemented on our target system is 
Class-2+ compliant and is also configurable to adapt itself 
to the target system, being compatible with different CPU 
configurations, with only minor adjustments.  
The debugger consists of one controller module and two 
memory banks for data input and output. An external 
clock is required as a source for the clock signals used for 
communicating with the OCD. As the debugger main 
purpose is fault injection campaign managment, it is built 
with reduced support for direct control, the emphasis 
being on executing scripted commands and reacting 
automaticly to specific messages or signals from the OCD. 
This last possibility is an important feature that is lacking 
in most other debuggers, as it is not required for commom 
debugging operations. At this phase the debugger supports 
only the NEXUS messages actually implemented on our 
OCD, with all messages sent from the debugger being 
preloaded on a memory bank that acts as a script for each 
debugging session. Two messages have special meaning 
to the debugger, being interpreted as internal commands, 
not sent to the NEXUS port. One allows for a delay 
interval before sending the next message and the other 
instructs the debugger to wait for an signal from the 
NEXUS port before sending the next message. The 
messages output from the OCD are also stored on a 
separate memory that can latter be used by an external 
tool for program flow analysis and fault effects diagnosis 
The data provided by the trace plus eventual error 
messages plus the knowledge of the running application 
make it possible to reconstruct the exact program flow.  A 
typical fault injection scenario is presented on Figure 1, 
where boxes #1 and #2 may represent simulation modules, 
physical devices or parts of the same FPGA. 
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Figure 1 – Debugger and Target System  
The target application for testing is the matrix_addFT 
program, which is a fault tolerant version of a matrix 
adder application. The fault tolerance is achieved by 
duplicating each arithmetic operation and then comparing 
the obtained results, with any difference triggering an 
error detection routine. Although not as powerful as 
hardware fault tolerance, this solution allows for some 
degree of dependability without modifications to the 
hardware, at the cost of memory space and some 
performance penalty.  
The NEXUS standard defines a minimum set of 
debugging features, the interface port and the 
communication protocol. The implemented features 
include all common OCD features plus access to memory 
in real time. The interface with the outside world is made 
using the AUX port option, which provides two message 
data buses for OCD data input and output along with 
independent clock and control signals. Two additional 
event pins allow halting the processor and exact timing for 
watchpoint / breakpoint signaling.  An additional (RSTI) 
pin is used for resetting the OCD infrastructure. 
The communication protocol is message based, with each 
message consisting of a six-bit header that indicates the 
message purpose and additional variable length data 
packets if required. The infrastructure accepts command 
messages and outputs response and status messages. All 
mandatory messages were implemented as well as 
additional optional (developer-defined) messages, as 
allowed by the NEXUS proposed standard, used for 
internal register access and OCD configuration. 
The implemented OCD infrastructure is divided in three 
main modules and two bus access modules as seen on 
Figure 2. The thinner arrows represent the several control 
and status signals and the thicker arrows represent data 
and trace information flow. The FI module represented is 
not included in the original OCD as it gives form to the 
OCD-FI version explained further ahead on this paper. 
 
Figure 2 – The OCD Infrastructure 
The MQM (Message Queuing and Management) module 
is both the NEXUS message handler and the OCD 
controller. It translates all debugging operations into 
messages and vice versa, manages the message queues 
and provides the necessary control signals to the other 
modules. The message queues are implemented using 
FIFO (First-In First-Out) memory blocks and in the case 
of an overflow, an error message is sent from the MQM 
module to the debugger, via the NEXUS port.  
The RCT (Run Control & Trace) module is responsible 
for CPU run control and bus snooping. It receives 
commands from both the MQM and RWA modules and 
outputs trace data and watchpoint hit signals. This module 
controls the CPU core clock and the signals required to 
identify branch and exception occurrences on the running 
application. The RCT module will enter DEBUG mode 
when requested by the MQM module, a breakpoint is hit 
or on reset, if configured to do so. In DEBUG mode all 
OCD resources are available although the application 
execution is halted. The RCT also includes several 
configuration registers, including OCD status and 
breakpoint conditions. It is possible to use up to two 
instruction and one data breakpoint and both types can be 
activated at the Nth occurrence of their trigger condition. 
Additionally a watchpoint may be generated in the same 
manner as either type of breakpoint. The bus snooper is 
used to monitor data and instruction bus activity and the 
RCT module uses this information for breakpoint / 
watchpoint generation and program trace. Program trace is 
performed using branch trace messaging as defined in the 
NEXUS 5001 standard, counting executed instructions 
and signaling on taken branches or exception occurrences.  
The RWA (Read & Write Access) module is used to 
access both OCD registers and CPU resources (memory 
and registers).  A register (RAW_reg) is used to store the 
data and address of the next read / write operation, as this 
information takes several clock cycles to be transmitted by 
the MQM module. This register is loaded whenever a 
message requesting a read or write operation is received.  
In normal conditions the actual operation is executed 
immediately on the rising edge of a signal sent from the 
MQM module after the RAW_reg register update is 
complete. Conflicts in RAM access are handled by the bus 
master with the OCD taking priority on access by default. 
As inputs and outputs are handled by the processor as 
directly mapped addresses it is possible to access those 
resources in the same manner as the processor would. An 
access to a CPU core internal resource requires the RCT 
module to be in DEBUG mode. 
The bus snooper and bus master modules are responsible 
for interfacing with the microprocessor buses. The 
complete OCD infrastructure provides a common set of 
debugging features and interface options that can be 
adapted to different target systems, and upgraded to 
support additional features or elements.  
 
3.2 Fault Injection Module 
The selected fault model is used in most common fault 
scenarios for microprocessor based critical systems [15] 
and consists of single bit-flip faults at random memory 
elements at also random moments during the application 
execution. The actual fault trigger can be any instruction 
occurrence of the running application, covering the entire 
execution time. The fault location can be any resource 
accessible for writing through the OCD, including 
memory, internal registers and stack. The fault injection 
campaigns are randomly generated by an external tool and 
then described as a script with the necessary messages to 
be sent to the OCD infrastructure, both for configuration 
and data collection.  
Any fault injection campaign must be initialized by 
loading the application into memory and setting up the 
OCD environment as required by the faults to be inserted.  
If the fault is to be inserted on an internal register or the 
stack, a breakpoint replaces the watchpoint, and the 
EVTO signal is replaced by a message acknowledging the 
entry on DEBUG mode following a breakpoint hit. 
Additionally, an extra message must be sent to restart the 
application execution after the fault injection process. The 
choice of starting the processor in debug mode or in 
execution mode depends on the instruction address that 
triggers the fault injection procedure. If it cannot be 
assured that enough time is available for setting up the 
required OCD registers then the processor must start in 
debug mode.  
Although the debugger allows a fast reaction to trigger 
condition(s), the actual fault insertion still requires the 
transmission and decoding of at least one complete 
message. The On-Chip Debug and Fault Injection (OCD-
FI) concept proposed on this paper consists of a hardware 
module to insert faults on the occurrence of the trigger 
condition(s) without further commands from the debugger 
and it is implemented within the OCD circuitry reusing 
some of the already implemented debugging functions. It 
requires the implemented OCD to execute write 
operations by pre-loading one or more registers and the 
write operation itself to be executed on the activation of a 
specific control signal.  Additionally the OCD must 
internally signal breakpoint or watchpoint occurrences. 
The Fault Injection (FI) module is represented in Figure 3. 
It monitors the watchpoint or breakpoint signal(s) so that, 
when enabled, it can activate a fault injection action. 
 
 
Figure 3 – Fault Injection Module 
The input signals FI_SEL and FI_VAL are used to access 
the FI_EN register, which enables and configures the FI 
module. The TRIGGER input prompts the execution of 
the FI operation. The output signal (FI_EXEC) is used to 
activate a memory write operation in order to insert a 
single bit-flip fault at a given address. This approach 
requires that both the data value to be written and the 
respective memory address have to be determined 
beforehand and preloaded in the OCD register (RAW_reg) 
that is used for data writing. To do this, a previous 
analysis of the running application is necessary to 
determine the target memory position contents at the 
injection instant. In this manner it is possible to determine 
the value that should be stored so that a single bit-flip is 
caused on the target. The required address and data vector 
must be downloaded to the OCD infrastructure prior to the 
watchpoint occurrence, and the RAW_reg register must not 
be rewritten until the actual fault activation. Once the fault 
is inserted, the FI module disables itself and all the OCD 
resources can then be used normally. All the fault 
injection set up can be done with the target processor 
running normally, but the fault activation may only take 
place after this set up is performed. The program trace is 
not affected and operates normally before, during and 
after the fault injection process, reacting exactly as if a 
“real” fault was inserted.  
For internal register or stack faults it is only necessary to 
add a breakpoint with the same address as the watchpoint, 
to assure the processor is halted at the fault injection 
instant. 
From the messages output by the NEXUS port it is 
possible to reconstruct the program flow and diagnose 
fault effects verifying if the fault was acknowledged by 
the error detection routine, and after the application runs 
its course it is possible to use the OCD to check if all 
results are correct.  
Two extra and optional NEXUS messages are used, one to 
enable and configure the FI module and another to set up 
the address and data values for the actual fault injection. 
Fault triggering can be done using either a breakpoint or a 
watchpoint. The watchpoint option allows the injection of 
faults without stopping the target system but can only be 
used for memory, as access to internal register requires the 
system to be halted. The signal used for fault activation 
can also be used for exiting the DEBUG mode and restart 
program execution, as represented in Figure 3 as a dotted 
line. In this form the OCD-FI infrastructure allows the 
insertion of faults in all resources mapped in the OCD, 
with a minimum time delay. 
Dependability verification it structured into fault 
campaigns, each one defining a set of fault injection 
executions where a specific fault location and trigger is 
selected. In each execution the processor is reset and the 
application runs from start. As stated before, the FI 
module can be programmed prior to the application start 
or in runtime, the only limiting factor being the fault 
activation instant. To determine the target memory value 
at the moment of the injection beforehand it is possible to 
either use the knowledge of the running application code 
or perform a prior faultless execution up to the fault 
triggering instant and use the OCD to read the relevant 
memory contents. The fault trigger condition is selected 
beforehand from the executed application code. These 
fault campaigns can then used for experimental evaluation 
of the target device fault tolerant characteristics and 
preliminary results were used to analyze the fault injection 
procedure itself. 
 
4 Experimental Results 
The target system, the debugger, the fault injection 
module and the different memories were designed as 
VHDL models using the ISE 7.1i development 
environment and simulated using the Modelsim 6.0a 
simulation engine. Two CPU configurations were used 
differing only in terms of bus width, both including full 
interrupt support and internal stack. Both configurations 
include separate ROM and RAM banks on the target 
system, the first for storing the program code and the later 
for application data. 
The fault campaigns were structured as follows: 
? All experiments part of the same campaign target either 
RAM or internal registers. 
? As a simplifying step the fault campaigns are also 
divided between those where the fault is activated before 
setting up is possible and those where this can be done 
with the processor running. 
? The OCD is configured once at the beginning of the 
campaign, with the configuration depending on the fault 
injection target (memory or registers). 
? A campaign is loaded into memory and the experiments 
are executed sequentially. 
? The instruction address that triggers each fault injection 
is randomly generated from the actually executed ROM 
space and each target memory position is also randomly 
selected from the used RAM space. 
? The results are retrieved after all the experiments are 
complete, their analysis being performed externally to 
check if the final results are correct and if the fault was 
detected by the fault tolerance routine. 
Each set of fault campaigns was executed on each of the 
configurations and repeated using both the original OCD 
and the OCD-FI infrastructure. After simulating several 
fault campaigns the following conclusions, relative to the 
fault injection processes, were reached: 
? The OCD-FI infrastructure does not affect the maximum 
microprocessor clock frequency, being possible to use 
the same frequency for all clocks. 
? Each infrastructure requires a minimum number of 
MCKI clock cycles for system set up prior to each fault 
injection operation and for the writing operation itself, 
as represented in Table 1. Set up time supposes that all 
configuration registers are already set up (prior to the 
fault injection campaign) and writing time is measured 
from the watchpoint hit to the writing instant of the 
intended value into memory. 
 
 OCD OCD-FI 
CPU Set up Writing Set up Writing 
8 bit 13 14 28 2 
32 bit 14 21 36 2 
Table 1 – Fault Injection Delay (in CLK cycles) 
 
? If targeting internal microprocessor registers, execution 
must be halted for only 2 additional clock cycles if using 
the OCD-FI infrastructure, which increases slightly the 
time interval required to run each fault campaign. 
? If using only the OCD for register access, the time 
interval during which the processor must be halted is 2 
clock cycles higher that the time required for memory 
writing. 
? When using only the OCD and memory as the target, 
some experiments return meaningless results because 
the CPU writes on the memory cell being targeted 
before the fault is inserted. This did not happen with the 
OCD-FI. 
The number of equivalent gates for each module and each 
CPU configuration is given by Table 2. The Bus Snooper 
and Bus Master modules gate counts are included in the 
RCT and RWA counts, respectively. 
 
8 bit 32 bit Module # Gates % # Gates % 
CPU core 9166 N/A 53717 N/A
RCT 2391 34 5113 27 
RWA 369 5 643 3 
MQM 4225 60 13045 69 
FI 75 1,1 75 0,4 
OCD-FI 7060 100 18876 100 
Debugger 766 N/A 1079 N/A
Table 2 – Area Overhead 
 
From the above values it is possible to confirm that the 
logic overhead of the FI module on the OCD 
infrastructure is minimal. It is also possible to see that a 
simple debugger tasked only with fault injection 
campaigns management and results storage requires 
comparatively little space on a programmable device. The 
area of the OCD itself it is somewhat large for the 
implemented CPU cores, as the used configurations are 
rather simple in terms of register and instruction support. 
This effect is less notorious as the CPUs increase in 
complexity, because the OCD area is mostly dependant of 
the size and complexity of the communication buses.  
 
5 Conclusions and Future Work 
From the available results it is possible to conclude that 
the proposed OCD-FI infrastructure is an efficient 
mechanism for verifying and validating the fault tolerance 
characteristics of microprocessor based systems. The FI 
module main advantage is the extremely fast reaction time 
and when compared with other alternatives, it provides an 
efficient methodology for fault injection, both in terms of 
reusability, resource coverage, performance and cost. If 
the necessary HDL modules are available the OCD-FI, 
can be used for injecting faults in the simulation phase, 
prototyping phase or on the final device if the FI module 
makes it that far. Faults can be inserted on most CPU 
resources with a minimum time delay, allowing non-
intrusive and fast fault injection campaigns. The achieved 
performance is better when targeting memory space and 
when the faults are not injected early in the application 
execution, and if this is the case, fault campaigns can be 
executed almost as fast as it takes to run the target 
application, without stopping it.  
The compliance with the NEXUS proposed standard 
provides a common basis for development and 
enhancement of the proposed methodology. In this sense, 
the OCD-FI concept can be extended to any NEXUS 
compliant microprocessor and other architectures, 
providing a very low logic overhead derived from the fact 
that the more complex functions are performed by the 
OCD infrastructure. As this is already required for debug 
purposes, the added FI module provides considerable 
advantages with little area overhead. It should be easy to 
add to most devices, and with eventual modifications it is 
a lightweight solution for most microprocessor 
architectures. As an added feature, the debugger may be 
included into the same programmable device as the target 
system therefore assuring the best performance and 
reducing necessary resources and associated costs, the 
only limitation being the availability of memory blocks 
for data storage.  
As a downside, we have the need of an adequate OCD 
infrastructure and the required availability of both the 
OCD and the target CPU in some type of HDL 
description. If injecting faults on a physical device, an 
external debugger is also required along with an adequate 
communication channel.  
Actually we are working on experimenting with different 
scenarios and on extending the OCD-FI concept to 
different microprocessor architectures including versions 
supporting hardware fault tolerance mechanisms.  
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